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The Adirondack region of New York State is an area whose 
economic possibilities and limitations have always been closely 
tied to its land and natural resources. It is the forest and 
mountains, the water and minerals, the regional beauty and 
accessible wilderness which have attracted most businesses, 
visitors, and residents to the Adirondacks, just as the rugged­
ness and relative isolation have kept others away. The physical 
land resource is endowed with economic consequence in the land 
market. It is there that values are assigned, ownership priv­
ileges exchanged, and land is transferred to persons able 
to put it to its most "productive11 use.
In this study four important elements of the Adirondack land 
market are depicted. They are 1) the characteristics of trans­
ferred land, 2) the characteristics of owners who have acquired 
land since 1968, 3) the uses to which the acquired land has been 
put, and 4) the factors which contribute to land values. Most of 
this paper is devoted to an econometric examination of the fourth 
point. Of special note is the finding that the values of 
Adirondack land have not appreciated equally across all the 
regional land use zoning classes. In general terms, the concern 
of this study is with how the link between land and owner is 
forged in a socially defined marketplace - who participates, what 
kinds of land are involved, and how land use policy affects both 
land and owners.1
1 An executive summary of this paper is available from the
author. A companion study profiles all Adirondack landowners, 
their property, and their attitudes towards land use controls, 
regardless of the date of parcel acquisistion (Geisler, et. al., 
The Adirondack Landowner Survey. Rural Sociology Bulletin 145, 
Cornell University, April 1985.)
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21. INTRODUCTION
Land appeals to a wide variety of people for many different 
reasons. Most of these reasons have economic significance in the 
sense that they are signposts to the value of the land. This 
economic value may arise where the land resource provides raw 
materials for the production of other goods, or it may arise 
where the land benefits a "consumer” directly. For example, 
Adirondack land provides homesites for hundreds of thousands of 
permanent and part-time residents, in many cases also serving as 
a major store of their personal wealth. It supplies the raw 
material inputs for the mining and timber industries, and 
supports significant pockets of agricultural activities. The 
rivers and lakes of the region collect the waters which provision 
other parts of the state. Adirondack land offers unique oppor­
tunities to hunters, snowmobilers, hikers, skiers, boaters, 
other recreationists, and all the businesses which cater to them. 
And much of the land sustains a valued and irreplaceable reser­
voir of nature free of the obvious marks of human intervention. 
Were the land market to function ideally, all of these potential 
economic values would be expressed in the market price of land.
Although a wide variety of people benefit from the Adiron­
dack land resource, it is the owner of the land for whom the 
dollar value of the land should be highest, at least in theory. 
Otherwise the owner would presumably be willing to sell the 
property to someone else who placed greater value on it. In 
actuality, whether or not the current owner is truly the person 
valuing the land most highly is a complex and even philosophical 
question. The existing distributions of property rights and of 
incomes mediate between the personal, abstract values placed on 
land and the dollars that any individual would sacrifice to 
either gain or retain the benefits of landownership. Moreover, 
it is not always necessary to be the owner of a piece of property 
in order to gain access to, or even control over, some of its 
benefits (eg . a view of it) . The purchaser of a piece of 
property will sensibly be willing to pay for only those of its 
characteristics which must be bought to be enjoyed.
The markets for landed property are particularly complicat­
ed . This is because, unlike most other economic goods such as 
paper cups or apples or refrigerators, land is fixed in loca­
tion. It cannot be reproduced at will, nor can it be used up or 
consumed in the normal sense of that term. Unlike production 
line products, each parcel is in many ways uniquely distinguish­
able from other parcels. These qualities of land often make 
comparisons of property and property values difficult, as any 
realtor or tax assessor can attest. For this reason, the amount 
of information prospective buyers and sellers can find about 
sales of "similar" properties is often insufficient to guarantee 
that a fair, "competitive" market price is agreed upon.
3The price paid is in any event not determined in the same 
way as for most other goods. Essentially every buyer of record 
albums can expect to pay the same price as anyone else at a given 
store. The buyer will probably decide which album to purchase 
and then shop around for the best deal. Each buyer of land, on 
the other hand, will very likely bargain with the seller over 
the price of a parcel of desirable property. Any price that is 
greater than the minimum amount the seller will accept and less 
than the maximum amount the buyer will offer is a possible sales 
price. The bargaining powers or abilities of the parties 
involved will help set prices in a way which can be reminiscent 
of price setting in some obviously noncompetitive markets. Every 
seller of land holds a small degree of monopoly power when there 
are no identical parcels on the market to be turned to by the 
prospective buyer.
All of these considerations suggest that caution should be 
exercised in approaching and interpreting economic analyses of 
land values. Traditional tools of microeconomic analysis are 
prone to misapplication when applied to land sales. However, at 
least one fruitful analytic approach acknowledges some of the 
unusual aspects of land and is commonly applied in land price 
studies. This approach, "hedonic regression analysis", specifi­
cally recognizes that land (and many other products) are not 
homogeneous. It assumes that property is valued as a whole only 
through a summation of the values placed on its distinguishable 
characteristics, such as those identified by this research in the 
Adirondack region.
The first empirical section of this study will report on an 
application of hedonic regression techniques to Adirondack land 
values. It asks which characteristics of the land increase or 
decrease its dollar value for current or potential landowners. 
The actual prices paid for the purchase of Adirondack properties 
are the measure of value analyzed. As is explained below, the 
analysis pays special attention to one particularly controversial 
characteristic of the land - the zoning classification into which 
it has been placed by the State of New York. The question of 
whether or not zoning has had a causal impact on land values is 
addressed.
The second empirical section of this report shifts the focus 
away from a strict examination of influences on land values and 
towards a broader perspective: the general circumstances of 
landownership. From this perspective, market prices are impor­
tant as a barrier to becoming landowner and as a measure of 
landed wealth. But prices are only one part of this story. Land 
tenure and land use concerns often lie behind land values. Who 
benefits from the land? Who decides how it is used? Any 
recognition of the central role land resources play in defining 
the character and well-being of the Adirondack region raises 
these questions too. The report' s focus shifts to ownership
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because, given the remarkable physical qualities of Adirondack 
land, both its uses and the access to its benefits are primarily 
determined by who its owners are, and by the dimensions of the 
socially created balance between the rights and responsibilities 
of ownership.
Before turning to the empirical results, a brief digression 
is presented on the major public forces determining the balance 
of Adirondack-landowner rights and. responsibilities.
2. THE ROLE QF THE NEW YORK STATE
2.1 Policy Background
A profile of the conditions of Adirondack landownership 
contains some unusual elements* This is primarily due to the 
history of the role played by the State of New York, which has 
had a major influence on landownership in two ways. First, the 
State is the largest single landowner in the region. Extensive 
State ownership was originally consolidated under a coherent 
management system with the creation of the State Forest- Preserve 
one hundred years ago (1885) . The Adirondack Park was created 
seven years later, in 1892, to include the northern Forest 
Preserve lands within its domain. The Park expanded over time. 
New York State owns and directly controls 38% of the six million 
acres within its current boundaries. Almost all of this land is 
obliged under the state constitution to be maintained as land 
that is "forever wild". The State slowly continues to accumulate 
Forest Preserve lands through purchases, donations, and tax 
sales. A purchase fund was most recently replenished by the 
voters of the state in 1972.
The second State influence is comparatively new. In spite 
of its long history of concern about land in region, before 1971 
the State exercised relatively little control over the private 
landholdings scattered throughout the Park. In that year the 
Adirondack Park Agency (APA) was legislatively established and 
charged with the mission to develop, encourage, implement, and 
enforce land use planning on private land in the region. Since 
1973 the APA has had direct zoning oversight over the 3.7 million 
acres of Park land which are still privately owned.
The establishment of a regional body able to supercede the 
land use control authorities of local governments is unusual, 
though not unique, in the United States. The movement towards 
the centralization of land use controls was strong during the 
early 1970' s throughout the nation. The Adirondack legisla­
tion was typical in that it grew out of concerns about the 
ability of local governments to manage threats to the environ­
mental integrity of the region as a whole. In the Adirondacks 
most of the traditional zoning powers can be returned to local 
governments, but only if they adopt APA approved land use plans. 
In practice, the State retains a major regulatory and planning
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presence at the local level. State policy is therefore able to 
bear directly on private as well as public uses of Adirondack 
land, and consequentially on the distribution of the land's 
benefits.
The 1973 legislation that transferred primary authority over 
land use controls from local to state government (i.e., the APA) 
also formulated a detailed zoning mechanism in the Adirondack 
Park Land Use and Development Plan (the Plan). Specifically, the 
Plan set up a system of regulations for six zoning categories 
covering all privately owned land in the Park. The Adirondack 
Park Agency was given authority over the issuance of permits for 
specified development activities in each of the zones.
Although the actual details of the Plan are quite complex, 
its most salient single feature is the regulation of building 
densities. The density regulations are minimal in the Industrial 
Use land class and in the designated "growth center" areas 
(Hamlet land class) . Land in Moderate Intensity areas can be 
built up to one "principal building" for every 1.3 acres on 
average. Land in Low Intensity areas requires an average of 3.2 
acres per principal building. Most restrictive are the regulat­
ions for Rural Use land, where an average of 8.5 acres must 
accompany the addition of each principal building, and for 
Resource Management Land, where a parcel must include at least
42.7 acres for each additional building. Clustering of buildings 
is encouraged.
The restrictions on Resource Management and Rural Use land 
are among the most stringent in the country. For many land- 
owners , the Adirondack Land Use and Development Plan was the 
first planning or zoning authority that any level of government 
had exercised over their property. Within the space of a few 
years landowners went from a situation in which most could "do as 
they wished" with their property, to one in which they had to 
apply for permission from an executive agency of state government 
if they wished to pursue a range of land use activities.
Not surprisingly, both the APA and the Plan have elicited 
strong feelings of support and opposition since their inception. 
The right of the state to assume a planning role usually left to 
(often reluctant) local governments is at the heart of the 
controversy. However, the impacts on individual landowners and 
the possible general economic repercussions of the Land Use Plan 
have been a subj ect of ongoing debate. Many Adirondack residents 
continue to express concern that the land use controls have had 
an adverse impact on economic activity in general and on land 
values in particular. In spite of strong feelings on the 
subject, actual evidence is sparse. One legislatively mandated 
study on this subj ect had to be abandoned in the mid-197 01 s due 
to lack of available evidence and adequate funding to develop 
it. Only one other previous study has explicitly and empirical-
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ly addressed the issue.2 The results of the present study will 
not completely resolve the debate. However, the results will 
help to put many of the arguments in perspective, and to confront 
them with the land transfer data actually observed in the 
1968-1983 period.
2.2 Measuring the Impact of hand Use Controls
The first empirical section takes up the question of 
zoning1s impact on land prices. The parcel *s zoning class is 
treated as one of several land characteristics that' might 
influence price. The land transfer data do not conclusively 
implicate APA zoning regulations as an important influence on 
price. Indeed, no on© can truly know what would have happened to 
the Adirondack land market in the absence of an APA or Land Use 
Plan. Instead of making a comparison of the situation existing 
with the Plan to what would have happened to the same area 
without it, we are forced to substitute a comparison of what was 
happening before the Plan existed to what has happened since. In 
addition, we can compare what has happened to parcels in the Park 
with- what has happened to similar parcels outside the Park.
Evaluation of the effects of the Plan precedes with a 
look at differential changes between land use zones over time. 
The presumption is that, because the regulatory stringency of the 
Plan varies by zone, there will be different impacts on land use 
and land prices in each zone, where land outside the Park is 
considered as a special "zone”. The practical problem is to 
associate the zonally defined effects strictly with impacts of 
the Plan.2 3
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Most of the data analyzed in this report comes from a 
questionnaire which was returned by owners of 1197 randomly 
selected parcels of Adirondack land. Note that parcels, not 
owners, were selected. The returned questionnaires represent 66% 
of the total mailed out. Parcels were chosen from 1982 versions 
of the twelve Adirondack county tax assessment roles. General 
results derived from this sample should be representative of all 
privately owned, fully taxable parcels acquired between 1968 and 
1983 if found within the 105 towns in or immediately adjacent to 
the Adirondack Park (see map on p. 7). Because owners of parcels 
including a structure on them were more likely to return the
2 Robert C. Anderson and Roger C. Dower. August 1980. "Land 
Price Impacts of the Adirondack Land Use and Development Plan", 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 62, #3.
3 Appendix I gives a discussion of the conceptual problems 
that complicate this task.
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Population gains and losx-s shown conic from United States Census figures.
8questionnaire, the uncorrected results may be biased. The 
existence of the bias was detected in the results of an abbrev­
iated follow-up survey of nonrespondents. Where this bias was 
believed to be significant, compensating measures were taken.
The sixteen year period between 1968 and 1983 was chosen in 
order to include parcels acquired both before and after the 
implementation of the Land Use Plan. However, the most recent 
transfer of ownership for each parcel was the only one about 
which information was collected. This is an consequence of the 
fact that assessment roles only list information about the 
current status of parcels. Getting a complete list of parcel 
transfers back to 1968 for a region of this size would have been 
expensive, if not impossible, since computerized records are 
incomplete. Even if possible, it would have been extraordinarily 
difficult to locate and send a questionnaire to the earlier 
purchasers of such property. If a parcel did transfer ownership 
more than once in the period under consideration, the circum­stances of the earlier transfer are unknown.
3.1 Hedonic Regression Results: What Influences Property Prices?3.1.1 Background
The characteristics of land parcels that exert an important 
influence on property prices generally include 1) the physical 
attributes of the land, 2) the physical and quality attributes of 
any structures on the land, 3) the important locational attri­
butes that describe the neighborhood or vicinity in which the 
parcel is found, and 4) any land use restrictions which apply to 
the property. When sales prices are compared statistically using 
hedonic regression analysis, these factors usually best explain 
the price variations between parcels. Hedonic analysis permits 
the grouping and comparison of parcels which are equivalent in 
all but one respect - for example, the zoning class it is in. 
The question can thus be asked, for example, how the price of a 
given parcel would have differed if it had been located in an 
area zoned differently.
Parcels which had single family homes or cottages on them 
when purchased were analyzed separately from a second group of 
parcels including all the undeveloped land and some with struc­
tures not dedicated to single-family residences. This distinc­
tion was maintained for two reasons. First, the separation 
erases any bias introduced by the higher response rates about 
parcels with single family homes on them. Second, density 
restrictions should have different effects on developed and 
undeveloped parcels.
9Finally, the regression analysis is restricted to the 
approximately two-thirds of the returned questionnaires which 
were about parcels purchased on the open market. The restriction 
to open market parcel purchases was made because the transfer 
prices of such purchases were most likely to be reflective of 
the full and current exchange value of the parcel. About 800 
open market transactions were sampled. However, when the cases 
were divided into 1) purchases made before or after the adoption of the Plan, 2) purchases including or not including single 
family residences, and 3) six APA zoning categories plus land 
outside the Park, few cases were left in some of the most 
interesting categories. 4 This necessitated the combination of 
certain land use classes into groups for the purposes of this 
analysis.5 6
3.1.2 General Interpretation of Regression Results
The results of the hedonic regression analysis can be found 
in Table 1. The variable to be statistically "explained" is the 
price (expressed in 19 82 dollar equivalents) paid tor the 
purchase of the parcel. The other variables are identified in 
Appendix II, and statistically described in Appendix III. For 
both regressions, a logarithmic transformation of the purchase 
price permitted the best fit of the model to the data. As Table 
1 shows, the model fitted to the sample without single family 
houses on it accounts for slightly more price variability than 
does the other model (R-square of .53 versus .46). If the model
4 See Appendix VI.
5 Parcels which belonged to the Resource Management and 
Rural Use classes at the time of purchase were combined into a 
"Tight Control" group, while the remaining land use classes in 
the Park were combined into a "Loose Control" group. The 
"Outside" group was reserved for parcels entirely outside the 
boundaries of the Park. Although logic and a preliminary 
examination of the data made this aggregation seem plausible, it 
effectively averages out any differences between the zones that 
are lumped together. Thus, any differences between (e.g.) Rural 
Use and Resource Management price histories will be masked. 
Parcels purchased before the existence of the Plan were grouped 
according to the zoning class to which the parcel belonged as of 
1982.
6 The most common measures of ngoodness-of-fit" are the 
R-square and adjusted R-square. The former figure tells us what 
proportion of the variability in prices is accounted for by the 
regression models• The latter figure gives us a similar measure 
adjusted for the number of parcels on which the results are 
based. These measures were among several considerations which 
went into deciding on the "best" model.
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TABLE 1
Hedonic Regression Results for Parcels With and Without Single Family House or Camp 
Open Market Sales Between 1968-1983 in the Adirondack Study Region
WITH SINGLE FAMILY 
HOUSES OR CAMPS (N=526)
WITHOUT SINGLE FAMILY





INTERCEPT 9.789* 30.00 8.642* 27.42
Physical characteristics
ACRES .011* 3.50 .028* 6.50
ACRESSQ' -.000029*** -1.90 - .000065** -2.51
LRFRONT <1=yes) .297* 3.09 .672* 4.51
LAKEVIEW (1=yes) - .013 - .10 a 276*** 1.66
RDNONE (1=yes) -.763* -2.87 - .446** -2.00
PUBSEWR (1=yes) . .413** 2.01
OUTHOUS (1=yes) - .314** -2.31 .
SPRINGH20 (1=yes) -.240*** -1.74 -.402** -2.07
STEEP (1=yes) - .208 -1.16
CABLE (l=yes) .277** 2.06
PHONE <1=yes) .238* 2.64 .923* 5.86
WOODLAND (1=yes) .157*** 1.80
CROPLAND (1=yes) . - .282 -1.04
BSNESLND (1=yes> ■ .594** 2.58
Locational cha racter i st i cs
DISHIWA (miles) -.007* -3.30 -0.002 -.89
DISCITY (miles) .003 1.38
DISVIL (miles) -.006 - .70 .031 .89
VILSQ1 - .003 -1.23
SOUTHERN (1=yes) .111 .89
WESTERN (1=yes) - . 239**** -1.52
NEARFP (1=yes) .165** 1.98 .248** 2.14
TAXRATE (percent) -.030* -3.78 -.025** ‘2.27
Transaction characteristics
PORTION (1=yes) -1.419* -7.33




WITH SINGLE FAMILY WITHOUT SINGLE FAMILY
HOUSES OR CAMPS (N=326) HOUSES OR CAMPS (N=455 )
COEFFICIENT STUDENT- COEFFICIENT STUDENT-
VARIABLE VALUE T VALUE T
Building characteristics
BLDG (1=yes) 
CAMPS (no.) .410* 2.71 .437** 2.38







BEDROOMS (no.) .017 .54
OTHROOMS (no.) . 049**** 1.54
SFFS (square feet) .0002* 2.89
SFFSQ1 -7 . 15E-9** -2.27
BLDAGE (years) .006* -5.03 .
FIREPL (no.) .316* 4.58
WOODHEAT (1=yes) -.236** -2.53
Zoninq class and time period (NEWL0OSE is base)
NEWOUT (1=yes) .295* 2.76 .177 1.12
OLDOUT (1=yes) .101 .57 - .118 - .55
NEWTIGHT <1=yes) * 234*** 1.86 - .053 - .26
OLDTIGHT (1=yes) .034 .17 .061 .29
OLDLOOSE <1=yes) .232 1.33 .228 1.37
Dependent variable: PRICE, the natural logarithm of price in 1982 dollars
R2=.53 ADJ- R2=.48 R2=.46 ADJ-R2=.43
N.B. A dot (.) means that the variable was not included in that model.
See Appendix II for explanation of variable Labels and Appendix 
III for a statistical description of the variables.
 ^ These variables are the squared values of the preceding variable.
* ' **^ ***^ **** jhe asterisks indicate the Student t- test significance levels for a two 
tailed test of . 01 , . 05 , . 10 , and .15 respectively. The statistical tests are intended 
to be illustrative only. It is likely that they overestimate the significance of the 
relationships because of the preliminary model building which was undertaken. Note 
that t-tests cannot legitimately be performed sequentially on a series of variables. 
The coefficients therefore are best interpreted as a measure of the relative strength 
of the relationships between prices and the variable in question. In sum, the fewer 
the stars and the larger the "tw value, the stronger the relationship of the variable 
with price and the more confidence in its importance for the land market.
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run for the parcels without single family houses on it is amended 
by dropping the single variable indicating the presence of any 
kind of structure (BLDG), and then fitted to a subsample of 
wholly undeveloped parcels only, the R-square drops even further, 
to . 32 (adjusted R-square of .26).7 These results suggest that 
we have done a better job of modeling the influences on price for 
the parcels with residences on them. It was in fact expected 
that the market for the relatively expensive residential parcels 
would be easier to model. For both economists and prospective 
buyers or sellers, the value of houses is probably easier than 
the value of land to compare and parameterize, and therefore to 
model.
It is a matter of opinion whether this degree of explana­
tory power is "good" or not. Some property value studies in 
urban areas have been able to explain over 80% of price variabil­
ity. Previous regression studies of Adirondack land values have 
been able to explain prices about as well as here or slightly 
better.8 A study of rural land values in the regionally zoned 
Pinelands region of New Jersey was only able to explain about 40% 
of the price variability there. In almost all land value studies 
there is substantial amount of observable price variability which 
is not explained by econometric models. This means either that 
economists have been unable to discern and model the logic of 
certain aspects of land pricing, or there is in fact a substan­
tial lack of regularity in the way land prices are determined. 
Relatively low levels of explanatory power are generally expected 
in diverse rural areas like the Adirondacks, where a well defined 
competitive market is often absent.
Given the logarithmic transformation of the dependent 
variable (purchase price), the coefficient values can be inter­
preted in proportional terms.9 Take the coefficient on ACRES 
for the WITH SF HOUSES regression as an example. The coefficient 
.Oil means that for every one unit (acre) increase in the size of 
the parcel, the price of the parcel would increase by 1.1% if all 
other characteristics of the parcel remained the same. For a
7 See Appendix IV.
8 One such study, completed by a Cornell University researcher 
in 19 7 5 , modeled five categories of Adirondack property. 
The R-square on a model developed for seasonal residences was 
relatively high. The fit for the sample of undeveloped "rural” 
parcels was quite poor, however. (Robert Craig, Thesis. 1975) 
The Anderson and Dower study of Adirondack zoning mentioned in 
footnote two employed a non-comparable regression technique.
9 This result can be derived with calculus by taking the 
partial derivative of the logarithm of price with respect to any 
of the explanatory variables.
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typical parcel costing about $34,000, an additional acre would 
be worth approximately $375. Similarly, the larger • 028 coeffi­
cient value on ACRES in the sample without single family houses 
means that every one acre increase in the size of those parcels 
is accompanied by an average 2.8% increment to price, all 
else held constant. A typical parcel costing $8,000 would thus 
increase in price by about $225 with an additional acre.
Actually, for those variables like acreage (ACRES) that also 
have a quadratic term (ACRESSQ) in the model, the interpretation 
is slightly more complicated. ® In both of the models presented 
all of the quadratic term coefficients are negative and small 
relative to the coefficient on the first (linear) term. This 
means that whatever the initial impact on price may be of adding 
another unit of these characteristics, the size^ of the impact 
diminishes (or gets more negative) slowly as more is added. This 
makes sense. The proportional impact on price due to an increase 
in the size of a parcel from 0 to 1 acres is surely greater than 
from 1000 to 1001 acres. However, the small coefficients on the 
squared terms imply that the per acre costs alter by only a few 
dollars in the typical smaller size and price ranges.
The interpret at ion of the coefficients on categorical 
variables (those with a l=yes describing them) is slightly 
different. The coefficient on these variables shows how much the 
price of a parcel that has the given attribute differs from the 
price of a parcel identical to it except for the absence of the 
attribute. For example, the coefficients on the variable 
indicating the presence of lake or river frontage (LRFRONT) are 
.297 in the first regression and .672 in the second. This means 
that for parcels including a single family home or camp, the 
price of a parcel with frontage averages 29.7% higher than for 
parcels without frontage, all else equal. The proportional 
impact of frontage on parcels without such structures is even 
greater, adding 67.2% on average to the price of an otherwise 
similar parcel. For our typical $34,000 and $8,000 parcels, the 
presence or absence of water frontage therefore influences price 
by approximately $10,000 and $5,400 respectively.
The central group of variables for this analysis, those 
under the rubric "Zoning Class and Time Period", also require 
special explanation. As mentioned, parcels were distinguished 
by whether they were purchased before or after the Plan began to 
be implemented (NEW v.s. OLD), and by which of the three land use 
control groups they belonged to (OUT, or outside the Park; TIGHT, 
or in the "Tight Control" group, and LOOSE, or in the "Loose 
Control" group). There are therefore six possible combinations 10
10 The other variables including quadratic terms are the distance 
to a village (DISVIL, VILSQ) , the number of bathrooms (BATHRM, 
BATHSQ), and the square feet of floor space (SFFS, SFFSQ).
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of zoning group and period of purchase.11 These six combinations 
are treated in conjunction in the regressions. One combination, 
parcels in the 91 Loose Control®1 group acquired after implementa­
tion of the Plan (NEWLOOSE) , is not explicitly included in the 
regressions because it serves as a base against which the 
prices in the other combinations are- measured. Thus, for the 
WITH SF HOUSES sample, the price of a parcel in the NEWQUT group 
is 2 9.5% higher on average than for parcels in the base group, 
all else held equal. The price-of a parcel in the NEWTIGHT group 
is also seen to be 23.4% higher than those in the base group on 
average, all else equal.
3.1.3 The Effect of the Land Use Plan on Property Prices
For both regression models, the only zoning coefficients 
which differ from zero with any statistical significance are the 
two just mentioned.* 12 ■ In other words, the only differences in 
parcel value that are captured in the zoning variables (all else 
held equal, of course) seem to be in the WITH SF HOUSES sample. 
There the value of parcels in the "Loose Restriction51 group 
acquired after the implementation the Plan seems not to have kept 
up with the value of post-Plan purchases both outside the Park 
and in the more restricted land classes.
This information can be expressed in a more understandable 
format. If.there has been an effect of zoning on land prices, 
the impact should show up in rates of price appreciation which 
■differ by zones. Table 2 expresses the hedonic regression coef­
ficients as changes measured from the pre-Plan average price to 
the post-Plan average price. The first thing to note from Table 
2 is that although the magnitudes of the new coefficients suggest 
between 10% and 30% changes over time, none of them are disting­
uishable from zero with an acceptable degree of statistical
' 11 These are listed in Table 1 as OLDOUT, NEWOUT, OLDTIGHT, 
NEWTIGHT, and OLDLOOSE. NEWLOOSE does not appear in Table 1 
for reasons explained in the text.
12 The Student t-statistic is a measure of significance. It 
compares the size of the coefficient to the precision with which 
it has been estimated. The larger the t-statistic, the greater 
is our confidence that the coefficient does not differ from 0 
strictly by chance. The asterisks in Table 1 denote conventional 
benchmarks of confidence. For example, one asterisk indicates 
that that there is only one chance in a hundred that the cor­
responding coefficient differs from zero (or the base zoning 
category for the zoning variables) only by luck. Larger numbers 
of asterisks indicate progressively less confidence that random 
factors have not led to seemingly significant results. The 
coefficients with no asterisks next to them are much below the 
levels of confidence with which most economists are comfortable.
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TABLE 2
Different Price Appreciation in Different Zoning 
Claeses for Parcels With and Without Single Family Homes 
(Post-Plan average price minus Pre-Plan average price)
ZONES APPRECIATION T-STATISTIC
RATES ■
Parcels including single family homes or camps
Outside Park 19,5% ($6,648) 1,15
Loose Restrictions -23,2% (-$7,909) -1,33
Tight Restrictions 20,0% ($6,818) ,93
Parcels not including single family homes or camps
Outside Park 29,5% ($2,379) 1,45
Loose Restrictions -22,8% (-$1,839) -1,30
Tight Restrictions -11,4% (-$919) -,49
Notes The appreciation rates show the percentage increment 
to price for the parcels in each zone through compar­
ing average "Before Plan" with "After Plan" prices, 
non-zoning parcel attributes held constant. They are 
calculated from the coefficients in Table 1. Dollar 
values in parentheses are evaluated for the median 
parcel values found in Appendix III,
confidence• However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
zonal effects on prices are trivial, Even though appreciation 
rates may not differ significantly from zero, they may differ 
from each other.
There is a notable difference between the zones where prices 
have gone in a positive direction and those where prices have 
gone in a negative direction. The results shown here signify 
that the price performance of any given parcel would have been 
"better" during the period in question (assuming price increases 
are good) if the parcel was outside the Park rather than in the 
"Loosely Restricted" zones. But an average property under the 
"Tight Restriction" zoning regime did no worse than property 
outside the Park altogether - if the parcel included a single 
family home at purchase. If a single family home was not 
included at purchase, then the price of "Tightly Restricted" 
parcels went in precisely the opposite direction, and approx­
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imates the decline in the value of the "Loosely Restricted” parcels.13
The inclusion in the WITHOUT SF HOUSES sample of parcels 
containing non-single family residential structures may confuse 
some interpretations of the results. When the regression was 
performed on the sample purged of all parcels including struct­
ures (see Appendix IV) , the following price differentials were 
obtained! 17.5% for parcels outside the Park, -34.2% for "Loose 
Restriction” parcels, and 6.4% for "Tight Restriction" parcels. 
These results are more like those for the WITH SF HOUSES sample. 
The 6.4% price appreciation observed on wholly undeveloped 
parcels is not negative. However, it is still small in relation 
to the appreciation for the corresponding WITH SF HOUSES parcels. 
Apparently, the largest price declines for "Tightly Restricted" 
properties in this particular sample were for the assortment of 
duplexes, motels, commercial properties, and non-single family 
residences that are included in the full WITHOUT SF HOUSES 
sample.
How might these results tie into the logic that zoning has 
had an effect? One hypothesis is that regulations have had a 
depressing effect on the economy of the Park as a whole. The 
depressed economy should lead to both reduced demand for homes 
and land and possibly an increase of supply - more properties for 
sale. If so, the values of land inside the Park should not keep 
pace with the values of land outside the Park. Cautious readers 
will point out that the effect on land values of a regional 
recession would not necessarily adhere strictly to the boundaries 
of the Park. In this case, the parcels sampled from just outside 
the Park boundaries would not be as useful as a base of compari­
son. Total effects of the Plan on land values would be under­
estimated. Disregarding this complication, the observed increas­
es in value for parcels in the "Outside Park" category and 
decreases for those in the "Loose Restriction" category confirm 
the recession logic. The observed differences between parcels in 
the "Outside Park" and "Tight Restriction" categories' are less 
obviously in concert with the logic. The results which do seem 
to fit in (for the full WITHOUT SF HOUSES sample) become suspect 
when the subsample of only undeveloped parcels is analyzed, given 
the 6.4% increase for "Tight Restriction" parcels there. In sum, 
the parcels subject to the most restrictions do not necessarily
13 The F-test, a relative of the Student t-test, confirms 
these impressions statistically. For the WITHOUT SF HOMES 
sample, the null hypothesis that price appreciation was equal 
across all three zoning groups could be rejected at the 87% 
confidence level. (F=2.05 with 2 and 429 degrees of freedom for 
the numerator and demoninator respectively.) For the WITH SF 
HOMES sample, the same null hypothesis could be rejected at the 
97% confidence level. (F=3.66 with 2 and 295 degrees of freedom.)
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perform any worse than parcels not directly affected by the 
Plan.
An embellishment to the previous hypothesis could rescue 
some consistency. The density restrictions should have especial­
ly strong effects in the Resource Management and Rural Use 
land use classes. They could create an artificial scarcity of 
housing in these tightly restricted zones. This would be 
consistent with the price appreciation observed for the "Tight 
Restrictions" group in the WITH SF HOUSING regressions. On the 
other hand, the density restrictions limit the development 
potential of properties in the tightly restricted zones. It 
therefore seems plausible that the demand for undeveloped 
property, and the demand for some kinds of nonresidential or 
commercial properties would also be curtailed. This would be 
consistent with the price depreciation observed on the "Tight 
Restrictions" group of parcels without single family houses or 
camps on them.
In summary, if one is willing to 1) accept the "Outside 
Park" parcels as a viable control group, 2) say that the Plan’s 
generally depressing impacts on economic activity in the region 
have predominated in the "Loosely Restricted" zones, and 3) say 
that the more parcel specific effects of density zoning^ have 
predominated in the "Tightly Restricted" zones, then it is 
possible to fit our zoning variable results into a consistent 
causal framework.
However, as implied in Appendix I, a number of other 
outcomes could have had causal explanations constructed for them. 
Part of what remains at issue is whether the zoning variables 
measure only the effects of zoning regulations. It could be 
argued, for example, that more general economic forces would have 
affected each land use area differently in any event. Urbaniza- 
tion pressures from the cities surrounding the Adirondack 
region might have put greater demand pressure on parcels just 
outside the Park boundaries than on parcels in the more remote 
land that would be more often put into "Tightly Restricted" land 
classes, for example. In fact this does not appear to be 
supported by the data, however. Experiments with variables using 
the distance of the parcel from the nearest city, and also the 
rate of 1970-1980 population growth in each of the townships, 
would have partly detected this kind of effect. But no statisti­
cally significant effects of these variables on price were seen.
A second macroeconomic alternative should be considered. Not 
all regional influences on the economy originated with the Land 
Use Plan. Just after the Adirondack Land Use and Development Plan 
was adopted, the OPEC oil embargo was imposed. A serious 
recession began, which was to be followed by an even deeper 
recession during the early 1980's. Several states close to the 
Adirondacks have been among those hit especially hard, as older
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industries have declined. In contrast, the years before the 
early 1970's, while not recession free, culminated an extended 
period of economic growth in the U.S. Therefore the date which 
separates the ''Before Plan" purchases from the "After Plan" 
purchases also marks a major change in the economy as a whole. 
Unless it can be argued that this change influenced the demand 
and supply for land equally across all zoning classes in the 
Adirondacks, the influence of land use regulations on land 
prices cannot be independently distinguished with a simple 
hedonic regression. But it is quite plausible that a recession 
would have different impacts on the demand for land in the 
Hamlets or growth centers than it would on the demand for 
Resource Management land in the back country.
There are two ways in which national forces may already be 
independently if crudely accounted for in the models. First, the 
Consumer Price' Index, which tracks changes in general urban 
consumer purchasing power, was used to deflate prices. Second, a 
trend variable that would capture any otherwise unexplained 
year-by-year price trends was included in exploratory analysis. 
However, neither variable was constructed to measure any distinc­
tions between land use zones. The observed relative decline in 
the value of "Loose Restriction" properties may therefore still 
be due to the impacts of national economic forces, and not only 
(or at all) to the impact of the Land Use Plan.
What, then, are fair conclusions to make about the influence 
of the State' s zoning interventions on land prices? The data 
analyzed here do indicate that the prices of land have fared 
differently depending on the land use class in which the land 
happened to be located. Those who are convinced that the 
zoning variables are not confounded by geographic effects 
unrelated to zoning regulations will take this as evidence that 
the Plan has influenced property values. Those who believe that 
other variables in the model have not adequately controlled for 
non-regulatory influences on price can reasonably respond that 
the zoning variables measure other impacts. In the next section 
the remainder of the variables considered in the model will be 
discussed, and should give a more complete basis for determining 
the adequacy of the models. Although a firm answer will remain 
elusive, a closer look at the other variables of Table 1 will 
be helpful ■ It will allow a comparison of the size of the 
ostensible price effects of zoning regulations with the size of 
the influence of many other factors.
3.1.4 Other Variables in the Model
Two maj or decisions must be made in the formulation of any 
statistical regression model. First, a decision must be made 
about which variables to measure and include in the model. 
Second, the way in which the variables influence each other must 
be modelled. The second decision for this study led to the
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logarithmic transformation of price and the inclusion of quadrat­
ic terms for certain variables, with the interpretive conse­
quences discussed previously. 1* The choice of variables and 
their importance in the model is discussed below.
Any characteristic of property that can be hypothesized to 
have an influence on price is fair gam® for inclusion in a 
hedonic model of property values. If important characteristics 
are left out of the model, the results for included character­
istics may be biased. If irrelevant characteristics are improp­
erly included, the precision with which the proper character­
istics can be analyzed declines. Because there are so many 
characteristics which might foe supposed to have an influence on 
property prices, the possibility for both types of problem cannot 
be ignored.14 5
Choosing the proper characteristics begins with common 
sense. This study drew on the traditional categories of vari­
ables! the physical characteristics of the parcel, the character­
istics of the homes on the parcel, and the locational attributes 
of the parcel. The policy variables defining the zoning class 
and Before/After-Plan period of purchase were also included. ^In 
addition, variables associated with the actual transaction 
were included. Other variables which influence property prices 
are the characteristics of buyers and sellers. However, for 
theoretical reasons their influence has been measured only indi­rectly . Hedonic theory maintains that the characteristics of 
buyers and sellers influence the supply and demand ^ for each of 
the property attributes separately. The coefficients on the 
property attribute variables have supply and demand influences 
imbedded in them. A more sophisticated but more restrictive 
second stage of hedonic regression analysis could be used to 
account separately for the buyer and seller influences on the 
supply and demand for each characteristic in the first stage 
model.
14 On page 12. The decision about which transformations to 
use was based on theoretical expectations and some ^goodness of 
fit” criteria, but was ultimately an ad hoc process.  ^ State of 
the art research usually applies the more systematic Box-Cox 
maximum likelihood search approach for hedonic models. However, 
this approach is quite costly, especially when more than a few 
continuous variables are involved. Even when Box-Cox is used, a 
number of ad hoc restrictions are put on the scope of the search 
to cut down on costs. The degree of improvement over a less 
rigorous approach is, therefore, not entirely clear.
15 some studies skirt around this problem by using discrim­
inant analysis to formulate a smaller number of variables 
composed of aggregated clusters of related characteristics• The 
interpretation of these created variables can be difficult.
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Although the general categories of characteristics are 
commonsensical, the choice of which specific characteristics to 
include and which to exclude is less clear cut. Sometimes prior 
expectations about prices are strong enough to ensure that a 
parcel characteristic is included, as with parcel size or with 
access to lake frontage. The presence of trees, the quality of 
the soil, the slope of the land, or the quality of wildlife 
habitat may not all be equally important to include. Where prior 
expectations were not firm enough, the decision about including a 
variable was based on the significance of the coefficients in 
exploratory ("stepwise”) regression analysis. Thus, the char­
acteristics listed in Table 1 and Appendix III are most, but not 
all, of those originally considered.
The physical attributes of the land shown in Table 1 that 
proved to be most important were those dealing with the size of 
the parcel in acres (ACRES, ACRESSQ)? the one marking the exist­
ence of water frontage (LRFRONT)? the variable indicating that 
the parcel had no road access (RDNONE); and the variable indicat­
ing that the parcel had included a telephone outlet on it when 
the parcel was purchased (PHONE) . Judging from the size of the 
coefficients and of the Student t-statistics, the acreage and 
water frontage variables and the telephone variable have the 
strongest positive impacts on the marginal price of parcels not 
including single family residences. The value of parcels that 
did include a single family home were very greatly diminished if 
they were so inaccessible that no roads lad up to them.
Of these most important variables, only PHONE requires 
further discussion. The variable is highly significant in both 
samples, and influences the value of a given parcel by 23,8% and 
92.3% in the two different regressions■ It seems unlikely that 
the simple presence or absence of phone service accounts for the 
importance of the characteristic. For the WITH SF HOUSES sample, 
it may be that parcels including homes with telephone outlets in 
them were of higher quality in other ways not modelled explicit­
ly. PHONES would then act as a proxy for these other quality 
attributes. For the WITHOUT SF HOUSES sample, some of the 
strength of the variable may be associated with the fact that 
parcels with a "phone outlet” on them also had structures on 
them. Even though the BLDG variable should have accounted for 
the existence of buildings, PHONE might again be picking up 
differences in structure quality. A less plausible interpreta­
tion is that there was indeed a "telephone outlet" on the parcel 
when it was acquired, but that there was not an actual structure. 
This would be true if "telephone outlet" was interpreted to mean 
a telephone line was accessible on the parcel. In this case, the 
variable PHONE is probably a location specific proxy for develop­
ment potential.
Other physical parcel characteristics were considered. 
The existence of a lake view for parcels that had no frontage
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(LAKEVIEW) was important for parcels in the WITHOUT SF HOMES 
sample, and even more important on the subsample of completely 
undeveloped parcels* The type of waste disposal system available 
on the parcel was also of some importance for price® Parcels 
including single family homes were worth 31.4% less than other 
parcelsf all else equal, if an outhouse was the only option 
available (OUTHOUS). Comparable parcels in the WITHOUT SF HOUSES 
sample were worth 41,3% more if they were in a location served toy 
public sewers. The type of drinking water supply had an 
additional price impact• The variable SPRINGH2 0 shows that 
parcels which only had spring water (as opposed to public water 
systems or wells, primarily) were of less value on average in 
both samples.
A steep slope on a parcel, which would be expected to 
increase the cost of developing the property, appears to detract 
from the value of WITHOUT SF HOUSES parcels, but only weakly so 
(see STEEP).16 7 There were too few responses from single family 
homes that did not have electricity to measure price effects of 
its availability there, tout the WITHOUT SF HOMES sample shows 
that a parcel serviced by an electric cable (CABLE) was worth 
27.7% more than equivalent parcels without electric access. This 
result is only surprising in that it isn*t stronger, especially 
in comparison to the coefficient on PHONE. Finally, of three 
variables describing the types of land included on the parcel, 
single family homes with wood or forest land included on them 
were slightly more valuable than such parcels without forests 
(WOODLAND); parcels excluding single family residences were worth 
more if the parcel included land 19for offices or business use” 
(BSNESLND), and worth insignificantly less than otherwise if the 
parcel included cropland (CROPLAND).
The models include three kinds of specifically locational 
characteristics • First they measure the influence of the 
parcel's distance to the nearest highway, city, and village 
(DISHIWA, DISCITY, DISVIL AND VILSQ). Second, they account for 
the portion of the study area in which the parcel is found. The 
SOUTHERN region included parcels from Fulton, Warren, Washington, 
and Saratoga counties. The WESTERN region included parcels from 
Hamilton, Herkimer, Oneida, St* Lawrence, and Lewis counties. 
The base region (NORTHEAST) was suppressed in the regression, and
16 The PUBSEWR variable may also be a location dependent 
measure of development potential on undeveloped land, or it may 
be an indication that a building already existed on the parcel. 
A similar qualification could be put on the interpretation of 
SPRINGH20.
17 The coefficient is also insignificant on the sub sample 
of wholly undeveloped parcels. Both results contrast with the 
1975 Cornell findings in Robert Craig, Thesis, 1975.
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includes parcels from Clinton, Essex, and Franklin counties. 
Third, close proximity to state-owned Forest Preserve is included (NEARFP)o
The positive coefficients on the NEARFP variable confirm the 
expectation that parcels in the neighborhood of Forest Preserve 
are boosted in value® This is probably because owners benefit 
from the use of the forest and the guaranteed absence of unwanted 
neighbors on that land® The variable NEARFP is subjective in 
that it only notes the presence of nearby Forest Preserve known 
to the owners® Twenty-eight percent of owners aware of nearby 
Forest Preserve explicitly stated that its presence had influenc­
ed their decisions to buy the property®
The_ three locational regions devised for the study seem to 
imply ^ little ^ of note with regard to prices, though there is a 
weak indication from the negative coefficient on WESTERN that 
parcels in the western half of the study area are not as valu­
able, all else being equal. It is conceivable that a different 
regional grouping of the parcels would have yielded more signifi­
cant results.
The only distance characteristic showing evidence of a price 
impact is the one measuring the distance of the parcel from the 
nearest major highway (DISHIWA)• As expected, the more isolated 
a single family home or camp is from access to a highway, the 
less( it is worth® The -.007 coefficient is highly significant 
statistically, but indicates that each additional mile leads to 
an average of only a 0.7% decrease in price. Therefore, parcels 
would have to be quite some distance- from a highway for the size 
of the decrease to reach the magnitude evidenced in some of the 
other coefficients. Although a negative coefficient is also 
found in the sample excluding single family homes, the impact 
there is much less strong. One possible explanation is that the 
owners need to travel to and from these parcels less often.
The lack of importance for the DISCITY variable may be .an 
indication of the lack of need on the part of most landowners to 
commute to the nearby cities. More surprising are the insignifi­
cant coefficients on the variable measuring the distance of the 
parcel to the nearest village. Several other studies of the 
Adirondack^ have shown this distance to have an important 18
18 A prior study of undeveloped Adirondack forest parcels 
found land prices to be positively influenced by proximity to 
Forest Preserve. See David H. Vrooman, Jr. 1976. Two Essays 
in Public Sector Economics? Land Values in the Adirondack Park 
and The Economics of the New York State Lottery. SUNY Albany, PhD Dissertation. /
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influence on land prices.19 It seems logical, too, that land­
owners would be concerned with the convenience of being near the 
services which a village can offer. Perhaps the variable1s lack 
of significance in this study is because the model included an 
extensive list of variables with which distance is related. 
Sewerage and water systems variables, and the presence or absence 
of roads, are often directly related to proximity to a village.
The final locational variable, TAXRATE, is of a different 
sort. This fiscal variable measures the average equalized rate of 
property tax which applied to the town in which the parcel is 
found. The rate measured was applicable at or near the time of 
parcel purchase. The variable is locational only because the 
measurement is town specific. It may be interpreted as a neigh­
borhood variable indicative of the general level of taxation^in 
the town, with all that implies for tax burden and service 
provision. In this case, the negative coefficient indicates that 
parcels in highly taxed jurisdictions tend to be worth less, all 
else equal. The result would make sense if, for example, high 
tax rates had been imposed out of need to raise funds to improve 
poor services. Alternatively, a wealthy town with a large tax 
base could provide a high level of service even if the tax rate 
was itself low. An independent and more direct interpretation is 
that the average town tax rate certainly applies to^the specific 
parcel under consideration. In fact, school tax districts that 
do not follow town boundary lines can cause substantial variation 
from the average town tax rate. This qualification aside, the 
negative coefficient implies that a given parcel that is taxed 
more highly is worth less. This indicates that the specific 
property tax burden has been capitalized into the value of the 
property.
The two transaction variables are not parcel character­
istics like the other variables. But neither are they attributes 
associated with the supply or demand for parcels which should 
remain embedded in the coefficients for each characteristic. 
They were included in the regressions in order to purge the other 
coefficients of extraneous influence.20 PORTION indicates that 
the parcel was part of a larger purchase. The large and highly 
significant coefficient on that variable for the WITHOUT SF HOMES 
sample indicates that such parcels were worth very much less than 
an equivalent parcel purchased on its own. This corresponds with 
the earlier observation that each additional acre contributes 
progressively less to price. The significant result on PORTION 
appeared only for the group of parcels excluding single family
19 Craig 1975, op. cit., Vrooman 1976, ibid.
20 If important variables are left out of the model but are 
potentially correlated with variables in the model,  ^the regres­
sion coefficients on the included variables may be biased.
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residences. This implies that the portion of the larger purchase 
that is not sampled (often including a structure) tends to 
dominate the purchase price.
The YEAR variable is a yearly price trend variable that is 
not statistically important when included in the model. Two 
other aspects of time are already included in the model. First, 
all the purchase prices have been transformed (inflated) to their 
1982 equivalents. Second the policy variables divide the period 
into pre- and post-Plan segments. The negative coefficient on 
YEAR may mean that there is a slight tendency for the real price 
of single family homes or camps to trend downwards over time, for 
reasons not readily explained in the context of this model.
The building characteristic variables show few surprises. 
In the WITHOUT SF HOUSES sample, parcels which include some kind 
of structure (see BLDG) are worth significantly more money. More 
detailed information is derived about the WITH SF HOUSES sample. 
There, the number of camps (CAMPS) or single family houses 
(HOUSES) is, of course, very important for price, though it 
should be noted that very few parcels had more than one such 
structure on them. The number of bathrooms (BATHROOMS) is a
time-honored key indicator of value, where the negative coef­
ficient on BATHSQ tells us that the fourth or fifth bathroom 
does not add as much to property values as the first or second 
bathroom. The square feet of floor space (SFFS) in the structure 
similarly is an important indicator of value that declines in 
its marginal importance as the structure gets larger. The 
relatively insignificant coefficients for the number of bedrooms 
(BEDROOMS) and the number of other rooms (OTHROOMS) reveal that 
the overall size of the structure and the number of bathrooms are 
more precise indicators of the property1 s value than the mere 
number of separate rooms in the house.
The age of the building (BLDAGE) is probably best interpret­
ed as an indicator of building quality. Older buildings have had 
more time to deteriorate. The coefficient of -.006 says that for 
every year the structure has aged, its value has decreased by an 
average of 0.6%, all else equal. Note that although the coeffi­
cient is highly significant, a structure would have to be fairly 
old for its value to become very much lower than if it were new. 
Two other indicators of building quality follow. The more 
fireplaces with chimneys a structure has (FIREPL), the greater is 
its value, all else equal. This highly significant coefficient 
probably is as much an indicator of the general type of structure 
that has one or more fireplaces as it is of the number of 
fireplaces as such. Finally, the WOODHEAT variable contrasts 
with other structures those buildings that were heated primarily 
with wood. A wood heated structure tends to be worth substantial­
ly less than is a similar parcel with other types of heating 
systems. Apparently wood has continued to be a source of heat 
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4. OTHER RESULTS OF LAND MARKET SURVEY 
4.1.1 Parcel Transfers and Median Prices
For the region as a whole, the yearly ups and downs in open 
market parcel transfers and parcel prices are closely tied to ups 
and downs in the national economy (see Figure 2) .2 -^ The number 
of transfers fell or was constant in every year of national 
recession, while price shifts were only slightly less well 
coordinated with the timing of shifts in GNP. Both (constant 
dollar) prices and transfers fell below 1968 levels in 1982.
There appear to have been shifts in the geographic concen­
tration of land transfers between the six year period before 
adoption of the Land Use Plan and the 10 year post-Plan period. 
For parcels which had neither a single family home nor a vacation 
cottage on them at the time of parcel transfer, there has been a 
proportional21 2 shift of transfers from inside the Park to the 
area just outside the Park (see Figure 3) . The largest propor­
tional drop between the two periods was for land in the Rural Use 
class. In comparison, the proportion of transfers of parcels 
including already existing homes increased after the Plan in the 
Hamlet class as well as in the area just outside the Park 
boundaries (Figure 4). Subj ect to the hesitations expressed 
previously, these findings could be consistent with the argument 
that zoning had channelled demand for housing and land away from 
the restrictive land use zones to parcels either outside the Park 
or in the least restrictive zones.
A simple comparison of (constant dollar) prices23 by
21 The use of the term "transfers" is a loose interpreta­
tion of the data because multiple transfers of the same parcel 
are not included. An overestimate the number of transfers in 
a given year could just as well occur insofar as large purchases 
appear subdivided but not retransferred on current assessment roles.
22 I.e. a measurement of the proportion (for each land use 
class) of all the parcels purchased before, as contrasted with 
the proportion purchased after, the Plan was implemented.
23 In other words, prices not controlling in a regression 
framework for the variable characteristics of parcels. The 
difference controlling for characteristics like acreage can make 
is great. For example, the median per acre price of primarily 
undeveloped land in the "Tight Control" combined parcel group 
actually rose from $653 to $808 ($296 to $632 per acre for 
parcels at least one acre in size) while the total price was 
falling from $13274 to $8065 (Appendix V). Obviously, the size 
of parcels was smaller in the post-Plan period (13 acres median 
fell to 7 acres). The apparent trend to smaller parcels on more
27
Figure 3. The Proportion of Open Market Parcel Purchases by Land Use 
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Figure 4. The Proportion of Open Market Parcel Purchases by Land Use 
Class, for Parcels With a Single Family Home or Camp
Before Plan (Jan 1968-Aug 1973)
After Plan (Sept 1973-Mar 1983)
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TABLE 3
Prices* of sample parcels bought on open market, by land use 
class, for periods before and after Land Use Plan
Before Plan After PlanLand Class (1/68-8/73) (9/73--5/83)
Hamlet
included house $40,698 ($48,688) $28,051 ($36,904)no house $28,571 ($34,486) $13,158 ($22,179)
Moderate Intensity
included house $37,611 ($50,701) $34,805 ($45,004)no house $9,735 ($17,198) $6,090 ($14,223)
Low Intensity
included house $33,265 ($48,822)
($12,751)
$33,569 ($38,453)no house $7,041 $6,993 ($23,521)
Rural Use
included house $20,661 ($38,700) $31,802 ($37,168)no house $11,062 ($15,896) $6,452 ($11,355)
Resource Management
included house $18,895 ($28,817) $35,068 ($40,061)no house $13,774 ($14,962) $15,327 ($29,922)
Outside of Park
included house $32,849 ($36,893) $37,731 ($41,226)no house $6,637 ($14,014) $5,600 ($13,054)
The prices are in constant 1982 dollarss. Median pricesare first, average prices in parentheses. Reference to 
Appendix VI shows where the calculations are based on a 
small number of parcels.
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zones shows evidence of change in relative price levels since the 
introduction of the Land Use Plan (Table 3)* For both^developed 
and undeveloped parcels , the median price of parcels m  Hamlets 
and Moderate Intensity areas was lower in the group of parcels 
acquired after the Plan than in the before-Plan group, while the 
price in Low Intensity areas remained relatively constant. 
Median prices outside the Park rose for the sample including 
single family homes, as did prices in the Resource Management 
areas. However, while median prices of Rural Use land rose for 
parcels including single family homes, it fell for parcels 
without such homes. The increases in the prices of Resource 
Management properties, and even more so the substantial decrease 
in the value of Hamlet properties, are particularly noteworthy. 
These results are largely echoed in the regression coefficients 
on the land use policy variables. They give some indication of 
which of the specific land use classes dominated results within 
the "Tight Control" and "Loose Control" groups. .
4.1.2 Other Characteristics of Parcel_Transfers__
Surprisingly few parcels with homes or camps on them were 
purchased with the involvement of a bank mortgage, especially 
inside the Park (see MORTGAGE, Table 1, Appendix V ) B e t w e e n  the 
pre- and post-Plan periods there was a distinct shift away from 
"cash" purchases of property. But "cash" transactions were more 
popular inside the Park than out, and have remained so. Mortgages 
financed through the owner have become increasingly common since 
1973. This trend developed nationally as interest rates skyrock­
eted . For Adirondack parcels, the median interest rate on 
mortgages during the whole period was 8%, and the median payback 
period was ten years.
For parcels which did not have a camp or house on them when 
purchased (see Table 2, Appendix V), cash transactions were even 
more popular (50-70% of all sales, depending on land use area) 
than in the single family home group. This is undoubtedly 
because lower dollar amounts are required for undeveloped land. 
For this group, the proportion of purchases conducted m  cash has 
held relatively constant between the two time periods. Cash sales 
were most common in the "Tight Control" areas.
Real estate broker involvement in sales (NOBROKER, Appendix 
V) has been increasing over time even as bank mortgages have 
declined in importance, with an exception for the "Loose Control 
areas in Table 2 of Appendix V. The highest level of realtor
involvement was with the post-1973 purchases of Rural Use and 
Resource Management parcels including a home (65%), and rne 
lowest was with pre-1973 purchases of undeveloped land outside
the Park (24%).
Not everyone who bought Adirondack property shopped around 
first. But in spite of the fact that only about 40% of all
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parcels were owned by people who had looked at more than two 
parcels before buying, only a few said that they had made 
unpleasant discoveries about their land after purchase.
Approximately two-thirds of the parcels sampled were 
acquired by purchase from a stranger, or on the "open market". 
On a year-by-year basis, the proportion of transfers purchased on 
the open market has remained fairly stable,24 This implies that 
there have been few major changes in the balance of forces that 
determine whether or not a parcel is sold, inherited, traded, and 
so on.
4.2 Parcel and Owner Characteristics: Inside Park. Outside Park
Just over one-third of the returned questionnaires (includ­
ing those not about open market transactions) concerned parcels 
outside of the Park boundaries. These parcels can provide a 
rough standard of comparison for the parcels inside the Park, and 
serve as a kind of "control" group. There were numerous impor­
tant differences in the characteristics of parcels and owners 
depending on whether or not the parcels were inside or outside of 
the Park.
In general, the parcels acquired inside the Park more 
commonly represented the characteristics of seasonal or recrea­
tional home ownerships than did parcels in surrounding local­
ities (Table 4) . Thus, parcels acquired inside the Park were 
significantly more likely to have lake frontage, to be forested, 
and to have been acquired for recreational purposes. They were 
less 1 ikely to have road access, or to include cropland, open- 
land, or brushland. In comparison to parcels outside the Park, 
parcels on the inside were somewhat more likely to be owned by 
persons describing themselves as very recently arrived permanent 
residents, seasonal residents, or nonresidents of the study 
region.
Although parcels lying outside the Park were more likely 
than inside parcels to have had a single family house on them 
when acquired, they were equally likely to have had a structure 
added to them. This is indicative of higher building densities 
outside the Park. A higher proportion of parcels inside the Park 
were owned by partnerships, a lower proportion were owned jointly 
by a husband and wife, and approximately equal proportions were 
owned by businesses.
Finally, parcels inside the Park were more likely to have 
been acquired by persons who a) inherited the land, b) paid less
24 a chi-square test of the hypothesis that the ratio of 
purchases to inheritances was constant between 1968-1983 could 
not be rejected with acceptable confidence.
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Comparison of Parcels Inside and Outside Park Boundaries 
(including non-open market transfers)
TABLE 4
Parcel Proportion of Parcels
Characteristic Having Characteristic
Inside Outside
Water frontage 34% 14%
Wood or forest land 56% 37%
Acquired for recreation 31% 25%
No road access from parcel 7% 4%
Cropland 5% 8%
Openland or pasture 16% 20%
Brushland 18% 25%Owner lived in area < 5 years 
(if permanent resident) 14% 11%
Owner is seasonal or non-
resident of area 44% 15%
Single family house* 40% 67%
Structure added later 27% 26%
Partnership owns 10% 7%
Husband/wife own 51% 57%Business or corporation owns 4% 4%
Inherited 17% 9%
Price > $30000 (1982 $) 32% 40%
Owner over 40 years old 77% 62%
Owner income in 1981 > $25000 55% 40%
Owner** approves Land Use Plan 29% 21%
Owner** says Plan impacts reg­
ional employment positively 4% 2%
Owner** says Plan impacts reg-
ional environment positively 38% 3 2%
* proportions are of structures with some kind of building on
them.** proportions are for owners familiar with Plan only.
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if they bought it, but c) were older and had higher incomes, 
and d) approved of the Land Use Plan and thought it had had 
positive effects on the economy and environment. Point (a) 
suggests that nonmarket forces may have a relatively strong role 
in determining land turnovers inside the Park. This is of 
interest in conjunction with the finding that seasonal residents, 
who were more likely to own inside-the-Park parcels, have 
on average owned their parcels as long or longer than permanent 
residents of the region. Both the importance of inheritance and 
the continuity of seasonal ownership are signs of comparatively 
stable ownership patterns inside the Park. Point (d) may 
indicate that the Plan has discouraged (encouraged) parcel 
acquisition inside the Park amongst those disapproving (approv­
ing) of regional land use policies; i.e. those who like what the 
Plan does are more likely to acquire land where it is in effect. 
Of course, it is also possible that the typical owner who has 
always purchased the type of recreational land found inside the 
Park was more favorably disposed towards zoning to begin with.
4.3 Parcel Size
Adirondack parcels acquired after 1967 tended to be small. 
More than half were less than or equal to one acre (see Figure 
5a). However, a quarter of them were adjacent to a second parcel 
in the same ownership (Figure 5b). Thus the average parcel size 
of almost 14 acres (pulled up from the smaller median because of 
a few very large parcels) probably underestimates parcel size 
from the owner5 s perspective. The parcels acquired during this 
period account for 66% of all privately owned parcels in the 
region. But they account for only an estimated 55% of the total 
privately owned land area in the region. This suggests that in 
the Adirondacks as elsewhere, the more recently acquired parcels 
tend to be smaller than the older parcels (those acquired before 
1968 in this case). This finding may be a manifestation of the 
national trend to subdivision of rural land, or it may also 
document the general propensity of larger parcels to transfer 
ownerships less often.
The largest average parcels were found in the Resource 
Management (48 acres), Rural Use (20 acres), and Industrial (87 
acres - but only two parcels) land use classes, while the 
smallest parcels were in the Hamlet and Moderate Intensity (3 
acres each) , and Low Intensity (9 acres) land use classes. All 
of these average sizes are larger than the minimum density 
guidelines for a single structure in each zone, although once 
again the averages are skewed to the high side by large parcels. 
Parcels outside the Park averaged slightly larger (at 15 acres) 
than the overall mean parcel size, and accounted for two-fifths 
of the area under study. Parcels tended to be smaller than 
average if they included a residence, were lakefront properties, 
were in a hamlet or village, or were owned by someone who owned 
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businesses or non-residents of the region, tended to be larger 
than average, as did parcels owned by someone who approved of the 
Land Use Plan. This latter point is of interest. Apparently, 
current owners of many of the very large parcels do not find the 
Plan to be onerous, perhaps because the land is large enough that 
the density regulations need not interfere with the owner's 
intentions for the property. Viewed otherwise, the large parcels 
tend to be in the hands of persons not likely to want to subdi­
vide and develop them.
4.4 Parcel Location
Over half the parcels in the sample were within 0.7 miles 
of the nearest accessible lake or river, and within 3 miles of 
the nearest village. These distances indicate the tendency of 
parcels to cluster around such features. Other median distances 
(as estimated by the respondents) appear in Table 5.
4.5 Intended Parcel Uses
The parcels were overwhelmingly acquired for residential 
purposes (Table 6) .25 More were intended for use as permanent 
residences than as seasonal residences (40% versus 26% of all 
parcels sampled). Private recreational uses were more likely to 
have been in the minds of owners acquiring properties for 
seasonal residences than for permanent residences, Speculative 
motives influenced 12% of the parcel acquisitions but were 
usually subordinated to other reasons for acquiring the parcel. 
Only for owners of 5-6% of the parcels was speculation a primary 
motivation for acquisition, and such owners were more likely to 
be businesses.
4.6 Characteristics of Structures
Half of the returned questionnaires were about parcels 
which had had a structure on them when acquired. The vast 
maj ority of these either had a "single family house" or a 
"vacation cottage or camp" on them. These residences averaged 
approximately 1 bathroom, 3 bedrooms, and 3 other rooms. Fully 
72% of the parcels with structures on them in 1982 were served by 
a septic tank sewerage system, a number which is very close to 
the 70.4% 1980 census estimate of Adirondack households discharg­
ing waste to a septic tank. Most houses were heated primarily by 
oil (43%) or wood (34%) when acquired. Twenty-nine percent of 
the homes have a different primary fuel source today, presumably 
as owners of oil or electric heating systems switched to less 
expensive fuel sources.
25 Though non-respondent bias would alter the figures 
slightly.
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Owner estimated distances from parcel to services or other points 
of interest (includes inherited parcels, gifts, etc.)
TABLE 5
Feature
...miles to the nearest...
Median Mean 
(miles)










accessible lake or river 
neighbor's house 
outdoor recreation area 













What did you intend as the primary land use at the time you 
acquired the parcel? (includes inherited parcels, gifts, etc.)
Most important An impor- 
or only use tant use
--- -Percent of parcels---
Intended Land Uses
Operate as farm ............ 2.5 4.8
Seasonal home .............. 18.5 25.8
Permanent home .......... 32.7 39.6
Speculative investment .... 6.1 12.3
Subdivide and sell lots .. . . 0.8 2.3
Develop commercially ...... 2.0 3.2
Harvest timber ....... .... 2.3 6.5Private recreational uses .. 13.2 26.2
Add to existing property ... 4.2 4.8
Other . . ......... . ..... • • • 0.8 3.4
NOTE: Respondents ranked more than one important use, so 
percentages do not add to 100%.
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There is some evidence that buildings are being added to 
Moderate and Low Intensity land use areas in disproportionately 
large quantities (as a percent of the number of parcels acquired 
in those areas) . This may be because these land use areas tend 
to include the sites around lake shores which have been most 
popular for residential use, and because density regulations 
areonly moderately restrictive there. Almost all building 
additions were on parcels owned by permanent residents. Seasonal 
residents rarely purchased property to be developed later, as 
shown by the fact that only a negligible proportion of parcels 
acquired by seasonal residents did not have a home already on 
them.
4.7 Land Use Classes
Of the returns about parcels within the Park® s boundaries, 
most concerned parcels in the Moderate Intensity (25%) , Rural 
Use (23%) , and Hamlet (22%) land classes, with smaller numbers 
from Low Intensity (19%) and Resource Management (11%) areas. 
According to APA statistics, land in the Resource Management land 
use class represents 52.4% of the private land area of the Park, 
but only 41.2% of the land area covered in the questionnaire 
returns was in this land class (Figure 6) . By contrast, the 
study surveyed uncharacteristically high proportions of acreage 
in most of the other classes. Only Rural Use land seemed to 
appear in this study in about the same proportion (32%) as it 
exists in the Park. The most probable reason for this result is 
the greater tendency of large Resource Management parcels to be 
owned by corporations and partnerships of long standing, meaning 
they would be excluded from consideration by the 19 68 cut-off 
date used in this study.
4.8 Owner Familiarity With the Land Use Plan
Fifty-eight percent of the parcels were owned by persons 
claiming familiarity with the regional Land Use Plan at the time 
of the survey. However, some of them certainly learned about 
the Plan after they had already acquired their property. Owners 
of parcels inside the Park were, as expected, more likely to be 
familiar than were owners of parcels outside the Park (64% to 
45%), However, about half of the parcels acquired since 1968 are 
owned by persons who did not know the land use class of their 
parcel. If the parcels outside the Park are excluded from 
consideration, the number improves to about three-fifths of the 
in-Park owners who at least made a guess as to which class the 
parcel was in. But a'substantial number of owners listed a land 
use class which does not agree with the one which was looked up 
by the researchers on APA maps. Although in some cases the 
discrepancy may indicate a failure by the researchers to ade­
quately identify the proper parcel for the owner, it seems 
certain that many owners are simply not aware of the details of 
the zoning geography, even as it applies to them. The lack of
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awareness on the part of owners of land inside the Park, if 
accurately reflected, makes it less probable that landowner 
preferences for specific Adirondack properties can have been 
strongly affected by the Land Use Plan.
5. Conclusions
The State of New York has taken an active and often contro­
versial role in directing the course of land use in the Adiron- 
dacks. This study has explored the consequences of this role for 
private land prices in the region, and has also presented some 
background information about landownership and parcel character­
istics.
The depiction of background characteristics covered the 
many distinctions between parcels inside and outside the Park 
boundaries; the predominance of small residential and lakefront 
properties in the sample; the proximity of parcels to water and 
to villages; the characteristics of the buildings (noting a 
substantial shift over time in primary heating fuels) that 
occupied about half of the parcels when purchased? the distribu­
tion of parcels by land use classes ? and the fact that many of 
the owners of property in the region remain unaware of important 
aspects of zoning in the region.
Some effects of the state * s alterations to the Adirondack 
landowner profile were discussed. Parcels near state owned land 
gained added value because of their location. Land prices have 
been both positively and negatively influenced by their location 
in different land use zones. However, isolating the influence of 
zoning from that of other factors over which the state has 
little control is difficult. Moreover, the magnitudes of the zone 
effects are only moderately large in relation to a some of the 
other influences on land and real property prices.
Some people believe that the zoning regulations effected an 
unconstitutional "taking” of the value of their property. It is 
indisputable that the promulgation of the Adirondack Land Use 
and Development Plan shifted the existing balance of property 
rights away from individual property owners and from local 
governments. And there may have been cases where individual 
parcels of land were deprived of value due to state actions, 
though this study did not address that question. However, without 
prejudging the legal merits of a "taking” claim, the results 
presented here do not support the contention that APA zoning has 
seriously impaired property values throughout the region.
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Because the zones (and the creation of the Park as a whole) 
were consciously tailored to fit pre-existing geographical 
circumstances, all the zones did not start out as equivalent 
areaso It is therefore harder to attribute the causes of new 
differences between zones solely to regulation. Other factors 
might have had differential impacts in different areas even if 
zoning did not exist. In order to move beyond the easy mechanical 
conclusions about statistical correlation to important^interpre­
tations about the force of causation, we must be confident that 
our model has adequately controlled for other location specific 
differences between parcels. An attempt was made to provide 
adequate location controls in the model.
The analysis is also hard to interpret because economic 
theory on this topic is of limited help. It does not provide 
strong expectations about the directions of price change that can 
then be checked against the real world. For example, common 
wisdom and simple economic theory lead to the expectation that 
undeveloped land in the most restrictively regulated areas should 
fall in value because its development potential has been curtail­
ed. This is the logic facing an individual owner who sees fewer 
options for the use of his or her individual parcel. In the 
aggregate, this perception of "fewer options" could indeed 
translate into reduced overall demand, and therefore prices, for 
undeveloped land. This presumes, of course, that development of 
this land was a commonly desired option to begin with.
But logical examples of effects working in the opposite 
direction for undeveloped land also exist. If potential buyers 
have refrained from offering high prices because of concern about 
uncontrolled development on neighboring parcels, stricter zoning 
could lead to higher overall demands and prices, Indeed, any 
history of zoning is replete with examples where zoning was 
introduced precisely with the intention of protecting property 
values from unwanted neighborhood effects. Take another ex­
ample. Minimum density regulations are intended to reduce the 
number of houses in a given area. As a consequence, the economic 
"supply" of houses in the area is also likely to be curtailed. 
The induced scarcity would generally lead to higher prices for 
existing housing. but it could also lead to an unexpected 
increase in the price of undeveloped land. This might occur if 
the demand for housing were very "inelastic" (i.e. if the 
increased cost of housing did not greatly reduce the number of 
homes desired) . Because density regulations require more land 
per house on average, more land might be demanded even to produce 
a smaller number of houses. In sum, the fact that many contra­
dictory outcomes can be shown to be theoretically consistent with 
effects of the Plan is disconcerting. A theory which predicts 
too many po s s ible outcomes is difficult to re j ect, and is 
evaluated almost exclusively based on personal predispositions
APPENDIX I
about its plausibility. Together with the normal difficulties 
that hinder the construction of statistical representations of 
the "real world", this theoretical indeterminacy weakens our 




Glossary of Variable Names Used in Report Tables 
ACRES: The size of the parcel in acresBATHROOMS: The number of bathrooms in the largest house or 
camp on parcel at purchaseBEDROOMS: The number of bedrooms in the largest house or camp 
on parcel at purchaseBLDAGE: The age of the largest house or camp when purchased 
BLDG: The number of non-single family house structures on the 
parcel when purchasedBSNESLND: Yes if parcel included land for business uses 
CABLE: Yes if electric cable reached property at purchase 
CAMPS: The number of "camps" or vacation cottages in purchase 
CROPLAND: Yes if parcel included land in crops within 5 years 
prior to purchase
DISCITY: Distance of parcel to nearest city
DISHIWA: Distance of parcel to nearest highway 
DISVIL: Distance of parcel to nearest village 
FIFTY+: Owner was fifty or older at time of purchase FIREPL: The number of fireplaces in the largest house or camp 
on parcel at purchaseHOUSES: The number of single family houses in purchase 
HTELEC: The largest house or camp was heated primarily with 
electricity when acquiredHTOTHER: Oil, gas, coal, or other main heat source in largest 
house when acquiredINCHI: Owner5 s family income more than $30,000 in 1981 INCMED: Owner5 s family income between $15,000 and $30,000 m  
1981INCLOW: Owner's family income below $15,000 in 1981 INCOTH: Owner not an individual (i.e. a business, institu­
tion)
LAKE VIEW: Yes if parcel did not include frontage, but had a 
lake viewLRFRONT: Yes if parcel included lake or river frontage 
NEARFP: Yes if parcel was within ten minute walk of Forest
PreserveNEWLOOSE: Yes if parcel purchased after 7/73 in the Moderate Intensity, Low Intensity or Hamlet land use classes 
NEWOUT: Yes if parcel purchased after 7/73 outside the Park
NEWTIGHT: Yes if parcel purchased after 7/73 in the Rural Use 
or Resource Management land use classes 
NORTHEST: Yes if parcel was in Clinton, Franklin, or Essex 
countiesNOBROKER: Yes if parcel was not purchased through a realtor 
NOCOLGRD: Owner did not graduate from fourth year of college 
NOHSGRAD: Owner did not graduate from twelfth grade
APPENDIX II
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OLDLOOSE: Yes if parcel purchased before 8/73 in what became 
Moderate Intensity, Low Intensity or Hamlet land 
use class areas
OLDOUT: Yes if parcel purchased before 8/73 outside the Park 
OLDTIGHT: Yes if parcel purchased before 8/73 in what became 
Rural Use or Resource Management land use class 
areas
OTHAGE: Owner was younger than 30 at purchase - or a business 
OTHERLND: Yes if parcel included land in other uses besides 
business land or cropland
OTHGRAD: Owner graduated from college - or was a business 
QTHMTGE: Yes if other kinds of financing involved 
OTHROOMS: The number of non bed- or bathrooms in largest 
house or camp at purchase
OTHSEWR: Yes if parcel not served by public sewer or outhouse 
OUTHOUS: Yes if parcel included an outhouse
PAYCASH: Yes if the buyer paid "cash" for the parcel 
PELSEWHR: Yes if owner owns any non-adjacent land anywhere 
PERMRES: Yes if owner described self as "permanent" Adiron­
dack resident
PHONE: Yes if parcel had phone "outlet" on parcel at purchase 
PNONE: Yes if owner owns no other property 
PORTION: Yes if parcel was part of larger purchase 
POTHER: Yes if owner owns other parcels outside of region 
PPERACR: Per acre price if parcel is greater than one acre 
PPERACRE: Per acre price (PRICE/ACRE)
PRICE: Purchase price inflated to 1982 dollars
PTOUCH: Yes if owner owns adj acent parcel
PUBSEWR: Yes if parcel served by public sewer system
RDNONE: Yes if no roads led up to parcel
SFFS: The square footage of the largest house or camp on 
parcel at purchase
SOUTHERN: Yes if parcel was in Fulton, Washington, Warren, 
or Saratoga counties
SPRINGH20: Yes if parcel9s drinking water came from spring 
STEEP: Yes if parcel was described as mostly "steep"
TAXRATE: Average equalized tax rate (per $1000 assessment) in 
township
THRUOWNR: Yes if the mortgage was financed through the seller 
WESTERN: Yes if parcel was in Hamilton, Herkimer, Oneida,
St. Lawrence, or Lewis counties
WOODHEAT: Yes if the largest house or camp was heated 
primarily with wood when acquired 
WOODLAND: Yes if the parcel contained woodland when acquired 
YEAR: Trend from 1 to 16 for 1968 to 1983 
30-49: Owner was 30 to 49 years old at time of purchase
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This appendix presents the descriptive statistics for those 
variables that were included in the regression models,  ^It also 
gives some indication of the magnitude of the missing data 
problem that is common for mail surveys. Data was missing for 
some parcels for some variables if the questionnaire respondent 
did not answer all questions on the questionnaire, and if there 
was no secondary information source from which to obtain the 
needed data. The "Before Estimation” column in the tables below 
gives the number of parcels (out of 338 or 471 in each sample 
respectively) for which information was not missing. Values for 
only two of the variables listed (BLDAGE and SFFS) were missing 
for more than about five percent o f the total parcel s. The 
HAfter Estimation" column lists descriptive statistics for the 
parcels included in the samples after the "holes” in the data set 
were filled in.
Parcels were dropped from the samples if "too many", or 3 to 
5 variables (inclusive of some not listed here), were missing for 
the parcel. Also, all cases with no estimate of sales price were 
dropped. Thus the "Before Estimation" columns are based on the 
maximum'number of actual responses given for each variable, while 
the "After Estimation" columns were based only on parcels for 
which information on a sufficient number of variables was 
available - with the added condition that the data for a small 
number of missing variables has been artificially generated.
The only truly satisfactory way to fill in missing data gaps 
is to somehow discover the true missing values. This task can be 
prohibitively expensive or impossible however, so several less 
satisfactory options remain. One option is to discard parcels 
with incomplete information. Because many parcels were missing 
information on only one variable, this option would have led to 
the dismissal of much valid data, might have left a biased 
residual sample, and would have left smaller sample sizes.2 A 
second option, to omit certain variables from the models, was 
also deemed unsatisfactory because the variables were believed to 
be important influences on land values.
The option adopted here for continuous variables was to 
statistically predict the missing values using other variables 
on the questionnaire (including some not in the regressions^and 
some of the independent variables in the regressions) as predict­
ors. The BMDP program BMDPAM permits such calculations. Minor 
missing variable problems for categorical variables arose with
APPENDIX III
26 A detailed discussion of missing data problems is found in 
Jacob and Patricia Cohen, Applied Multiple Recrression/Correlation 
Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Chapterl_s_ John Wiley, 
1975.
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LRFRONT and LAKEVIEW. Logistic regression was used to predict 
the value of these variables when they were missing. However, 
since the proportion of parcels with lake access was 30% or less, 
a simple assumption of no frontage usually would be correct.
A separate analysis evaluates the differences between 
persons who did and did not respond to the questionnaire. It is available upon request.
Means, Standard Deviations, Medians of Continuous Regression Variables: Before, After
; Missing Data Estimation
After Estimation Before Estimation
(326 Parcels) (338 Parcels Tot.)
NUMBER OF
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEAN STD.DEV. MEDIAN PARCELS MEAN
Parcels with homes
PRICE Price (1982$) 41369 33645 34092 338 40651
ACRES Acreage 9.5 31.4 0.7 338 10.0
ACRESSQ Acres Squared 1073.1 6140,9 0.5 338 1154
BATHROOMS Bathrooms 1.1 0.7 1.0 325 1.2
BATHSQ Bathrooms Squared 1.8 2.4 1.0 325 1.8
BEDROOMS Bedrooms 2.8 1.5 3 323 2.8
BLDAGE House Age (years) 39.4 36.5 28.6 285 40.2
CAMPS No. of Camps, Cottages 0.4 0.6 0 338 0.3
DISCITY City Distance (miles) 27.4 22.2 23.0 333 27.4
D1SHIWA Highway Distance (mites) 21.3 22.2 12.3 320 20.7
DISVIL Village Distance (miles) 4.1 4.6 3.0 328 4.1
FIREPL No. of Fireplaces 0.4 0.6 0 338 0.4
HOUSES No. of 1-Family Homes 0.7 0.5 1 338 0.7
OTKROOMS Other rooms 2.9 1.5 3 321 2.8
SFFS Floor Space (sq.ft.) 1502 1751 1200 282 1495
SFFSSQ Floor Space Squared 5315126 30791709 1440000 282 5632343
TAXRATE Town Tax Rate(%) 2.5 4,8 2.5 329 2.5
VILSQ Village Distance Squared 37.8 100.4 9.0 328 37.0
YEAR Trend (1968=1, 1983=16 8.8 4.3 9.0 338 8.8
Parcels without homes <455 Parcels) <471 Total Parcels)
PRICE Price (1982$) 18995 30343 8064 460 18690
ACRES Acreage 14.6 35.0 1.1 465 14.9
ACRESSQ Acres squared 1433 - 1.21 465 1442
DISHIWA Highway Distance (miles) 17.7 19.8 10 452 17.9
DISVIL Village Distance (miles) 4.0 3.8 3 444 4.0
TAXRATE Town Tax Rate (%) 2.5 5.2 2.5 456 2.5
VILSQ Village Distance Squared 29.1 58.4 9 444 30.6
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Parcels Without Single Family Homes, Camps: Categorical Variable 
Distribution Before, After Missing Data 
Estimation
After Missing Data Estim- Before Missing Data Estim­
ation: 455 Parcels ation: 471 Total Parcels
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION YES (%) PARCELS YES(%)
BLDG Structure on Lot 13.3 471 13.4
BSNESLND Land for Business Use 7.5 461 7.2
CABLE Electricity Available 54.2 464 53.7
CROPLAND Land Recently in Crops 4.1 461 3.8
LAKEVIEU View if Without Frontage 14.5 438 13.8
LRFRONT Lake or River Front 18.1 426 19.2
NEARFP Near Forest Perserve 36.1 454 35.7
NEWOUT Postplan, Out of Park 27.4 471 26.5
NEUTIGHT Postplan.Res Mgmt, Rur Use 11.1 471 11.3
OLDLOOSE Postplan, Ham-Mod-Low Use 19.5 471 18.8
OLDOUT Preplan, Out of Park 9.3 471 9.8
OLDTIGHT Preplan, Res Mgmt, Rur Use 9.1 471 9.3
PHONE Phone Outlet Present 27.9 462 27.5
PORTION Part of Larger Purchase 9.5 471 8.9
PUBSEUR Public Sewer Service 10.0 462 9.7
RDNONE No Road Access 7.3 467 7.5
SOUTHERN Southeastern Counties 41.5 471 40.5
SPRINGH20 Spring as Water Supply 9.1 461 9.1
STEEP Steeply Sloping Lot 10.0 467 10.5
WESTERN Western Counties 21.0 471 20.6
Parcels With Single Family Homes: Categorical Variable Means Before 
and After Missing Data Estimation
After Missing Data Estim­
ation: 326 Parcels
Before Missing Data 
Estimation: 338 
Total Parcels
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION YES <%) PARCELS YES (%)
CABLE Electricity Available 92.3 337 92.0
LAKEVIEU View of Lake 9.5 320 10.0
LRFRONT Lake or River Front 28.7 320 29.4
NEARFP Near Forest Preserve 33.6 333 33.0
NEWOUT Postplan, Out of Park 26.1 338 26.0
NEUTIGHT PostpLan, Rural-Res Mgmt 11.9 338 11.5
OLDLOOSE Preplan, Ham-Mod-Low Use 13.0 338 13.2
OLDOUT Preplan, Out of Park 10.5 338 10.4
OLDTIGHT Preplan, Rur Use, Res Mgmt 7.0 338 6.8
OUTHOUS Outhouse or Cesspool 8.9 334 8.9
PHONE Phone Outlet 72.9 334 71.4
RDNONE No Road Access 1.9 338 2.0
SPRINGH20 Drink Spring Water 8.9 333 8.3
WESTERN Western County 21.9 338 21.6
WOODHEAT Wood Heat 25.2 323 25.7
WOODLAND Wood or Forest Present 37.6 335 36.7
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APPENDIX IV
Hedonic Regression Results for Parcels Without Single Family House or Camp and 
for Completely Undeveloped Parcels: Open Market Sales Between 1968-1983 in
the Adirondack Study Region
COMPLETELY WITHOUT SINGLE FAMILY HOUSES 
UNDEVELOPED (N=283) OR CAMPS (N=455)
COEFFICIENT STUDENT- COEFFICIENT STUDENT- 
VARIABLE VALUE T VALUE T
INTERCEPT 8.736* 21.77 8.642* 27.42
Physical characteristics
ACRES .033* 5.63 .028* 6.50
ACRESSQ1 -.000125* -2.92 -.000065** -2.51
LRFRONT (1=yes) .891* 4.75 .672* 4.51
LAKEVIEW (1=yes) .516** : 2.50 o 276*** 1.66
RDNONE (1=yes) -.611* -2.62 -.446** -2.00
PUBSEWR (1=yes) .332 .72 .413** 2.01
SPRINGH20 (1=yes) - .407*** -1.83 -.402** -2.07
STEEP (1=yes) -.217 -1.06 - .208 -1.16
CABLE (1=yes) .319** 2.18 .277** 2.06
PHONE (1=yes) .923* 5.86
CROPLAND (1=yes) -.249 -.72 -.282 -1.04
BSNESLND (1=yes) 1.076** 2.48 .594** 2.58
BLDG (1=yes) - .437** 2.38
Locational characteristics
DISKIWA (miles) -.0003 -.09 -0.002 -.89
DISVIL (miles) - .041 -.91 .031 .89
VILSQ1 - .004 -1.43 -.003 -1.23
SOUTHERN (1=yes) .067 .44 .111 .89
WESTERN (1=yes) - .218 -1.14 * „ 239**** -1.52
NEARFP (1=yes) .145 1.00 .248** 2.14
Transaction characteristics




COMPLETELY WITHOUT SINGLE FAMILY HOUSES
UNDEVELOPED (N=283) OR CAMPS (N=455)
COEFFICIENT STUDENT- COEFFICIENT STUDENT-
VARIABLE VALUE T VALUE T
Fiscal characteristics
TAXRATE (percent) -.029*** -2.06 .025** -2.27
Zoning class and time period (NEWLOOSE is base)
NEWOUT (1=yes) .025 .12 .177 1.12
OLDOUT (1=yes) .150 -.53 .118 -.55
NEWTIGHT (1=yes) -.179 -.75 .053 - .26
OLDTIGHT (1=yes) .163 .66 .061 .29
0LDL00SE (1=yes) -.064 -.30 .228 1.37
Dependent variable: PRICE, the natural logarithm of price in 1982 dollars
R2=.32 ADJ- R2=.26 R2=.46 ADJ-R2=.43
N.B. A dot (.) means that the variable was not included in that model. 
See Appendix II for explanation of variable labels and Appendix 
III for a statistical description of the variables.
These variables are the squared values of the preceding variable.
** *** **** The asterisks indicate the Student t-test significance levels for a two 
tailed test of .01, .05, .10, and .15 respectively. The statistical tests are intended 
to be illustrative only. It is likely that they overestimate the significance of the 
relationships because of the preliminary model building which was undertaken. Note 
that t-tests cannot Legitimately be performed sequentially on a series of variables. 
The coefficients therefore are best interpreted as a measure of the relative strength 
of the relationships between prices and the variable in question. In sum, the fewer 
the stars and the larger the "t" value, the stronger the relationship of the variable 




Parcels With Single Family Homes or Camps Compared by Zoning Restrictiveness 
and by Purchase Before or After Land Use Plan
VARIABLE UNITS OUTSIDE PARK LOOSE CONTROLS TIGHT CONTROLS
1/68- 9/73- 1/68- 9/73- 1/68- 9/73-
8/73 5/83 8/73 5/83 8/73 5/83
Parcels No. 35 88 44 109 23 39
Continuous Variables (medians)
PRICE 1982$ 32849 37731 39154 32268 16529 32000
PPERACRE 1982$/Acre 77434 51192 57107 62334 3904 18541
PPERACR 1982$/Acre 5237 9864 13860 10789 1881 7513
ACRES Acres 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.3 2.3
DISVIL Miles 3 2 3 2 5 4
DISHIWA Mi les 9.5 7.3 13.5 15 25 20
TAXRATE $/1000 25.5 25.8 27.2 24.2 24 22.8
CAMPS No. 0 0 1 0 1 1
HOUSES No. 1 1 1 1 1 0
BATHROOMS No. 1 1 1 1 0.5 1
BEDROOMS No. 3 3 3 3 1 2
OTHROOMS No. 3 3 2.5 3 2 2
SFFS Sq. Ft. 1451 1202 1000 1200 700 1000
BLDAGE Years 31 39 26 30 24 28
FIREPL No. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Categorical variables
PORTION % 11.4 3.4 2.3 1.8 8.9 5.1
LRFRONT % 17.1 14.8 56.8 27.5 34.8 30.8
LAKEVIEW % 6.1 4.8 16.7 14.2 4.8 8.1
CABLE % 88.6 95.5 95.5 97.2 73.9 79.5
COUNTY
SOUTHERN % 42.9 52.3 38.6 44.0 43.5 41.0
WESTERN % 22.9 22.7 29.5 17.4 26.1 17.9
NORTHEST % 34.2 25.0 31.9 38.6 30.4 41.1
NEARFP % 20.0 13.6 40.9 40.4 52.2 43.6
PHONE % 85.7 78.4 63.6 75.2 39.1 56.4
RDNONE % 2.9 1.1 0 1 .8 8.7 2.6




OUTSIDE PARK LOOSE CONTROLS TIGHT CONTROLS
BSNESLND % 5.7 4.5 9.1 2.8 0 0
CROPLAND % 5.7 8.0 4.5 7.3 4.3 10.3
OTHERLND % 88.6 87.5 86.4 89.9 95.7 89.7
HOME HEAT
WOODHEAT % 14.7 18.4 20.5 25.5 47.6 42.1
HTELEC % 2.9 10.2 9.1 19.3 4.3 15.4
HTOTHER % 82.4 71.4 70.4 55.2 48.1 42.5
SEWERAGE
PUBSEWR % 22.9 20.5 9.1 24.8 0 0
OUTHOUS % 2.9 6.8 9.1 5.5 26.1 17.9
OTHSEWR % 74.2 72.7 81.8 69.7 73.9 82.1
SPRINGH20 % 8.6 3.4 11.4 2.8 34.8 20.5
STEEP % 0 6.8 11.4 9.2 17.4 15.4
NOBROKER % 60.0 43.2 61.4 39.4 47.8 35.9
MORTGAGE?
PAYCASH % 28.6 22.7 50.0 32.1 47.8 25.6
THRUOWNR % 8.6 10.2 13.6 22.9 13.0 38.5
OTHMTGE % 62.8 67.1 36.4 45.0 39.2 35.9
OWN MORE LAND? 
PTOUCH % 22.9 17.0 15.9 11.9 21.7 10.3
PELSEWHR % 25.7 31.8 52.3 46.8 43.5 48.7
PNONE % 51.4 51.2 31.8 41 .3 34.8 41.0
OWNER AGE
FIFTY* % 22.9 15.9 15.9 26.6 26.1 12.8
30-49 % 57.1 51.1 75.0 54.1 52.2 66.7
OTHAGE % 20.0 33.0 9.1 19.3 21.7 20.5
SCHOOLING
NOHSGRAD % 11.4 9.1 9.1 8.3 13.0 7.7
NOCOLGRD % 60.0 52.3 52.3 55.0 34.8 38.5
OTHGRAD % 28.6 38.6 38.6 36.7 52.2 53.8
INCOME
INCHI % 22.9 20.5 38.6 31.2 34.8 38.5
INCMED % 45.7 53.4 36.4 43.1 26.1 43.6
INCLOW % 25.7 19.3 18.2 15.6 30.4 7.7
INCOTH % 5.7 6.8 6.8 10.1 8.7 10.2
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TABLE 2
Parcels Without Single Family Houses or Camps Compared by Zoning Restrictiveness 
and by Purchase Before (1/68-8/73) or After (9/73-5/83) Land Use Plan
OUTSIDE PARK LOOSE CONTROLS TIGHT CONTROLS
1/68- 9/73- 1/68- 9/73- 1/68- 9/73-
8/73 5/83 8/73 5/83 8/73 5/83
dumber of Parcels 46 125 87 116 44 53
VARIABLE UNITS
Continuous Variables (medi ans)
PRICE 1982$ 6637 7951 10178 7417 13274 8065
PPERACRE 1982$/Acre 2226 5061 11309 9271 653 808
PPERACR 1982$/Acre 821 842 1343 3158 296 632
(if > one acre)
ACRES Acres 1.5 1 0.8 0.7 13 7
DISVIL Miles 3 3 3 2.5 5 4
DISHIWA Miles 10 7 14 11 13 12
TAXRATE $/1000 28.5 26.4 24.2 23.2 24.3 25.4
Cateqori cal. Variables
PORTION % 8.7 7.2 9.2 11.2 6.8 9.4
LRFRONT % 15.2 8.0 33.3 20.7 22.7 7.5
LAKEVIEU % 8.9 6.9 13.9 17.9 12.2 23.4
CABLE % 53.3 54.4 59.3 63.8 30.2 43.4
COUNTY
SOUTHERN % 32.6 46.4 48.3 31.9 43.2 37.7
WESTERN % 30.4 26.4 20.7 19.0 13.6 7.5
NORTHEST % 37.0 27.2 21.0 49.1 43.2 54.8
NEARFP % 32.6 23.2 36.8 38.8 40.9 43.4
PHONE % 39.1 32.0 27.6 28.4 11.4 15.1
RDNQNE % 6.5 5.6 7.0 5.2 13.6 11.3
LAND USE
LNDBUS % 4.3 8.0 12.6 7.8 2.3 1.2
LNDCROP % 6.5 2.4 2.3 2.6 4.5 11.3
LNDOTHER % 89.2 89.6 85.1 89.6 93.2 87.5
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TABLE 2 Continued
SEWERAGE OUTSIDE PARK LOOSE CONTROLS TIGHT CONTROLS
PUBSEWR % 6.5 12.0 13.8 12.9 0 0
OUTHOUS % 8.7 3.2 12.6 9.5 6.8 7.5
OTHSEWR % 84.8 84.8 73.6 77.6 93.2 2.5
SPRINGH20 % 13.0 6.4 5.7 3.4 18.2 20.8
STEEP % 8.7 5.6 8.0 12.7 20.5 15.1
NOBROKER % 76.1 63.2 58.6 68.1 63.6 64.2
MORTGAGE
PAYCASH % 52.2 58.4 55.2 56.9 68.2 71.7
THRUOWNR % 10.9 13.6 19.5 21.6 13.6 17.0
OTHMTGE % 36.9 28.0 25.3 21.5 18.2 11.3
PERMRES % 69.6 71.2 37.9 41.3 34.1 52.8
OWN MORE LAND?
PTOUCH % 28.3 28.0 29.9 26.7 32.6 22.6
PELSEWHR % 34.8 24.8 43.7 37.9 47.7 37.7
POTHER % 36.9 47.2 26.4 35.4 19.7 39.7
OWNER AGE
FIFTY* % 19.6 20.8 24.1 31.0 15.9 13.2
30-49 % 41.3 41.6 56.3 49.1 65.9 60.4
OTHAGE % 39.1 38.6 19.6 19.9 19.2 26.4
SCHOOLING
NOHSGRAD % 17.4 13.6 16.1 9.5 11.4 15.1
NOCOLGRD % 69.6 52.8 49.4 44.8 45.5 37.7
OTHGRAD % 13.0 33.6 34.5 45.7 43.1 47.2
INCOME
INCHI % 15.2 15.2 26.4 25.9 38.6 20.8
INCMED % 37.0 51.2 42.5 46.6 38.6 41.5
INCLOW % 26.1 18.4 11.5 15.5 11.4 15.1
OTHINC % 21.7 15.2 19.6 12.0 11.4 32.6
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Numbers of sample parcels bought on open market, by land 
use class, for periods before and after Land Use Plan
APPENDIX VI
Land Class
















































NOTE: Data covers all parcels in Adirondack^, not just those 
acquired after 1967,
HOW MANY OTHER PARCELS IN STUDY REGION
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